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Abstract
In this paper we argue that the new availability of digital data sets allows one to
revisit Gabriel Tarde’s (1843–1904) social theory that entirely dispensed with
using notions such as individual or society. Our argument is that when it was
impossible, cumbersome or simply slow to assemble and to navigate through the
masses of information on particular items, it made sense to treat data about social
connections by defining two levels: one for the element, the other for the
aggregates. But once we have the experience of following individuals through their
connections (which is often the case with profiles) it might be more rewarding to
begin navigating datasets without making the distinction between the level of
individual component and that of aggregated structure. It becomes possible to give
some credibility to Tarde’s strange notion of ‘monads’. We claim that it is just this
sort of navigational practice that is now made possible by digitally available
databases and that such a practice could modify social theory if we could visualize
this new type of exploration in a coherent way.
Keywords: Social theory; Gabriel Tarde; actor-network theory; digital methods;
data visualization
Introduction
It is generally accepted in the various sciences dealing with complex collective
behaviour that there exist some fundamental differences between the indi-
vidual and the aggregate levels (Knorr and Cicourel 1981; Calhoun et al. 2007).
This is why it seems common sense to state that there should exist two levels of
analysis: the micro level that focuses on individuals; the macro level that
focuses on the aggregates. The consequence of such a distinction is that almost
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all the questions raised by social theory have been framed as the search for the
right pathway that leads from one level to the other: should the inquiry begin
from the micro or from the macro level? Is the macro a mere aggregate or a sui
generis? How do some macro features end up emerging out of the interactions
going on at the micro level (Boudon 1981)? Is it possible to ‘reconcile’ the two
levels by another more encompassing theory (Bourdieu 1972; Giddens 1984)?
Is it possible to imagine an intermediary level, a ‘meso’ one? And so on. This
framing of questions is not limited to social theories dealing with humans, but
has a bearing on all collections of non-humans living organisms (flocks of birds
and swarms of social insects in particular) (Axelrod 1984; Moussaïd et al. 2009)
as well as on the very notion of how an organism comes to be organized (for
instance, how do individual cells relate to the whole body?) (Dawkins 1982)?
Those same questions have been extended to a wide range of phenomena such
as mental processes (Minsky 1988) or artificial entities living in silico (for
instance, multi-agents models) (Epstein and Axtell 1996).
Although this division in levels has had an enormous role in shaping many
research programmes in the natural and social sciences, it has also obfuscated
the central phenomenon those sciences wished to account for: how to follow
stronger, wider and longer lasting associations. By presupposing that there exist
two levels, they might have solved too quickly the very questions they should
have left open to inquiry: What is an element? What is an aggregate? Is there
really a difference between the two? What is meant by a collective entity
lasting in time?
In this article,we wish to consider how digital traces left by actors inside newly
available databases might modify the very position of those classical questions
of social order. Our aim is to test an alternative social theory developed by
Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904) in the early days of sociology but which never had
any chance to be developed because of the lack of empirical tools adjusted to it
(Tarde 1903; Clark and Tarde 2011 [1969]; Milet 1970; Candea 2010). Instead of
starting by saying that the really important question is ‘to find out how indi-
vidual decisions relate to collective actions’, we want to do exactly what Tarde
suggested and refrain from asking this question so as to lessen its import and to
turn our attention to a different topic: is there a way to define what is a longer
lasting social order without making the assumption that there exist two levels
(Latour 2005)? To dramatize the contrast, we will claim that there is more
complexity in the elements than in the aggregates, or stated a bit more provoca-
tively that‘The whole is always smaller than its parts’.We call this hypothesis ‘the
one level standpoint’ (1-LS) in contrast with the ‘two level standpoint’ (2-LS).
Such a hypothesis has a chance to fly only if it makes an empirical difference
in the treatment of data.This is why we will attempt to demonstrate two points:
a) some of the new digital techniques and in particular a few of the tools
offered by network analysis may allow the tracing and visualization of
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the social phenomenon in a way that makes the 1-LS slightly more
commonsensical than the 2-LS alternative;
b) it might now be possible to account for longer lasting features of social
order by learning to navigate through overlapping ‘monads’ instead of
alternating between the two levels of individual and aggregate. (Note
that in what follows, the adjective ‘social’ should not be limited to human
agents but extended to all entities treated severally).
To go some way toward proving our points, we will proceed in the following
way: we will first make use of the notion of profile to give the general flavour
of our argument (section 1); then, we will explain how our approach is different
from the idea of structures emerging out of atomistic agents in interaction
(section 2) and then how the notion of structure should be replaced by the
circulation of differently conceived wholes (section 3). The remaining sections
offer visual descriptions of ‘wholes’ that are much smaller than their parts
(section 4) and suggest another type of navigation through data sets than the
one associated with the idea of modelling (section 5).
1. How digitally available profiles modify the element/aggregate relations
The gist of our argument may be offered by considering how profiles now
available on so many digital platforms are quickly modifying the very defini-
tion of what individuals are – and, correlatively, how we should handle
aggregates. Although this reduction of the social connections to html pages
linked to other html pages may sound too drastic, it is this experience of
clicking our way through platforms such as Flickr™, Academia.edu™ or
MySpace™, of surfing from document to document, encountering people and
exploring communities without ever changing level that we wish to use as an
occasion to rethink social theory. Of course, there exist many other platforms,
but in this article we will draw heavily on Web 2.0 to exemplify our arguments
because it has turned 1-LS navigation into a mainstream experience which
might be captured in a sentence: the more you wish to pinpoint an actor, the
more you have to deploy its actor-network.
Let’s take a simple example. We all have had the experience of preparing a
meeting by searching on the web the name of the person we are soon to meet.
If for instance we look on the web for the curriculum vitae of a scholar we have
never heard of before, we will stumble on a list of items that are at first vague.
Let’s say that we have been just told that ‘Hervé C.’ is now ‘professor of
economics at Paris School of Management’. At the start of the search it is
nothing more than a proper name. Then, we learn that he has a ‘PhD from
Penn University’, ‘has written on voting patterns among corporate stake
holders’, ‘has demonstrated a theorem on the irrationality of aggregation’, etc.
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If we go on through the list of attributes, the definition will expand until
paradoxically it will narrow down to a more and more particular instance.Very
quickly, just as in the kid game of Q and A, we will zero in on one name and
one name only, for the unique solution: ‘Hervé C.’. Who is this actor? Answer:
this network. What was at first a meaningless string of words with no content,
a mere dot, now possesses a content, an interior, that is, a network summarized
by one now fully specified proper name. The set of attributes – the network –
may now be grasped as an envelope – the actor – that encapsulates its content
in one shorthand notation.
In such a now common exploration, an entity is entirely defined by the
open-ended lists in the databases. Using the terminology of actor-network-
theory (ANT), an actor is defined by its network (Law and Hassard 1999).This
network is not a second level added to that of the individual, but exactly the
same level differently deployed. In going from the actor to its network, we
remain safely inside the 1-LS (Law 2004).
The main point is that this definition is entirely reversible: a network is fully
defined by its actors. If we now wish to go from this particular professor to
some of his attributes, we might not be forced to change levels: the paradigm
of ‘stakeholders voting’ will be defined by another list, this time the list of ‘all’
those scholars who write in it, and of ‘all’ the articles published that used those
key words – something that bibliometry and scientometrics allow doing with a
few more clicks (see Figure I and section 4 for examples). The same would be
true if we wished to know what is this strange university called ‘Paris School of
Management’: its profile will be given in part by the list of its academics. So
there is no real difference in searching the identity of a person, a place, an
institution, an event and so on. In all cases, the empirical and cognitive opera-
tion is the same. By circulating in such a way from the actor to the network and
back, we are not changing levels but simply stopping momentarily at a point,
the actor, before moving on to the attributes that define them. It is because
there is no jump to another level that ANT defines as ‘flat’ the connections thus
designed by its method of circulation through data sets (Callon and Latour
1981; Latour 2005).
This new experience of moving easily through profiles already makes clear
that what is meant by 2-LS and 1-LS social theories does not refer to different
domains of reality but to different ways of navigating through data sets (Fran-
zosi 2004; Michel et al. 2011). ‘Specific’ and ‘general’, ‘individual’ and ‘collec-
tive’, ‘actor’ and ‘system’ are not essential realities but provisional terms that
depend rather on the ease with which it is possible to navigate through profiles
and to envelop them inside their names.The more cumbersome the navigation
is, the stronger will be the temptation to handle them through the 2-LS.As long
as it is difficult to reach the list of all the articles of a subfield such as ‘super
majority voting’, one will be tempted to define it generally as ‘a whole’ – the
very notion of ‘paradigm’ does just that (see below) – of which the individual
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professor named ‘Hervé C.’ is just a ‘member’. It is the same thing if there is no
good web site listing all the academics in this university called ‘Paris School of
Management’. Then, one will be tempted to say that there is a generally
defined entity – for instance a ‘corporate body’ – whose proper name is ‘Paris
School of Management’, which exists in relative independence from all the
Figure I: Detail of the ‘profile’ of the keyword ‘self-organization’
Note: The network is built using as nodes all keywords, authors, references and addresses of
the articles which use the keyword ‘self-organization’ in the Web of Science© between 2006
and 2010. The size of the nodes and labels is proportional to the number of articles in which
an author, institution, reference or keyword appears. Links between two nodes are created
whenever these two entities appear in the same article. Weights are attributed to these links
depending on the frequency of these co-appearances.
Node spatialization is performed using Gephi’s ForceAtlas 2 algorithm (Jacomy et al.
2011). ForceAtlas2, a graph layout algorithm for handy network visualization). In this
approach, links are interpreted as springs, and nodes which are strongly linked tend to
appear close to each other. The node corresponding to self-organization has been deleted to
improve readability as it was connected to all nodes in the graph.
All images are available in high quality at http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/
monads
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actors that define its envelope. This is where the two-level argument begins to
take hold: one for the parts, another for the whole. It will seem irresistible to
argue that to define general features, one should look at the level of structures;
if one wishes to look at specificity, go to the level of individuals. However this
distribution of roles between levels is a consequence of the type of technology
used for navigating inside datasets.
The best proof that those two levels do not correspond to any real ontologi-
cal domains is that they begin to disappear, to be literally redistributed, every
time one modifies or enhances the quality of access to the datasets, thereby
allowing the observer to define any actor by its network and vice versa. This is
exactly what the striking extension of digital tools is doing to the very notions
of ‘individual’ and ‘wholes’. The experience (more and more common nowa-
days) of navigating on a screen from elements to aggregates may lead research-
ers to grant less importance to those two provisional end points. Instead of
having to choose and thus to jump from individuals to wholes, from micro to
macro, you occupy all sorts of other positions, constantly rearranging the way
profiles are interconnected and overlapping. This is what has been well recog-
nized not only by ANT, but also by scholars working with network analysis
(White 2008). Of course, we do not claim that digitally available profiles are so
complete and so quickly accessible that they have dissolved the two levels, but
that they have already redistributed them enough to offer an excellent occasion
to see that those levels are not the only obvious and natural way to handle the
navigation through datasets about entities taken severally. (see Figure II.)
To sum up this first section, we will claim that one is tempted to treat an
entity differently from its context only because of a lack of access to the list of
attributes that make up that entity. At the very least, the digitally available
profiles open new questions for social theory that don’t have to be framed
through the individual/collective standpoint.
2. How to trace overlapping ‘monads’
After having provided a flavour of our overall argument, we may now move to
its more substantial and technical aspects. In 2-LS social theory, the most
current approach to handling the distinction between macro-structures and
micro-interactions consists in establishing a first level of individual entities,
then adding to them a few rules of interaction, in order to observe whether the
dynamics of interaction lead to a second level, that of aggregation, which has
generated enough new properties to deserve to be called a ‘structure’, that is,
another entity for which it is possible to say that ‘it is more than the sum of its
parts’. Such is the way in which most models of collective behaviour are
framed, no matter if they deal with atoms, gas, molecules, insects, swarms,
markets, crowds, States, artificial lives, etc. (for examples, see Moussaïd et al.
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2009).The explanatory power and the sheer beauty of those models are tied to
such a mini-max: the longest enduring structure with the lightest sets of rules.
It is important to underline here that since the seventeenth century this
paradigm has been set in opposition to its apparent alternative that starts with
a sui generis entity – for instance a body, an organ, a superorganism, an anthill,
a beehive, a society, a State, etc. – in order, then, to define its individual ‘parts’
as endowed with ‘roles’ and ‘functions’. Such an alternative is often called
‘holistic’ or ‘organicist’ (Weick 1995). Although the two views usually differ in
the political consequences one can draw from them (Hirschman 1977), for us
they are just two different ways of handling the social phenomenon by using
the same 2-LS standpoint since both rely, as we shall see, on much the same
data collection techniques. Their main difference is in the time order in which
Figure II: A typical screen experience mixing aggregated and individualized data sets
Note: A typical screen experience with the aggregates on top, the statistics on the right hand
side and the individual blogs on the bottom left with highlighted words (the example is taken
from the platform Linkscape© by Linkfluence©). It is this superposition that renders syn-
optically coherent the two end points of so many social theories that, we claim, is the
experience that should provide the occasion to rethink Tarde’s ancient argument that the
two end points are an artifact of the ways data are handled.
All images are available in high quality at http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/
monads
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they list the three concepts: from the micro to the macro for the first, from the
macro to the micro for the second. What the latter takes at its starting point,
the former takes as its future horizon.
Let us take the former as our starting point since it is nowadays the most
frequently used. To define the first level, the model builder has to imagine
individual atoms limited to as few traits as possible; then to devise rules of
interactions between those atomistic entities – again as simple as possible; then
to observe how those interactions, after many fluctuations, stabilize enough to
deserve the name of a structure; and then to check if this structure is suffi-
ciently robust to be used as substitute for the ‘wholes’ that their adversaries –
the holistic or organicist theorists – claim to exist before or above the ‘parts’
(Wilson 1975).
These are the research strategies that are followed, for example, when,
against the arguments of the anthill as a super-organism, ethologists succeed in
obtaining the highly complex geometry of the ant nest with only a few rules of
interaction between blind ants considered as interchangeable actors (Pasteels
and Deneubourg 1987; Moussaïd et al. 2009; Khuong et al. 2011). But it is also
the fascinating beauty of market models when, without the push of any ‘invis-
ible hand’, the sheer interaction of selfish but calculating individuals succeeds
in settling on an allocation of resources more optimal than those any State
would generate. Or when ‘selfish genes’ are said to provide a coordination of
body parts that no notion of an organ superior to the cells could ever dictate
(Kupiec and Sonigo 2000). Or again, what happens when sociologists manage
to map out the segregation patterns of city dwellings with only two rules
of attraction and repulsion among individual neighbours (Schelling 1971;
Grauwin et al. 2009).
This approach can succeed in reproducing and predicting the dynamics of
some collective phenomena when the individuals’ behaviour can be satisfac-
torily described with a few parameters and fixed rules. For example, within a
stadium audience the coordinated ‘Ola!’ wave pattern can be explained by
characterizing the reactions of humans by only three states (excitable, active
and passive) (Farkas et al. 2002). By calculating the transition probabilities
between these states, scientists might be able to predict the size, form, velocity
and stability of the emergent ‘Ola!’, and even how the probability of occur-
rence of a wave depends on the number of initiators (triggering an ‘Ola!’
requires a critical mass of initiators). When only a handful of parameters
suffice to simulate the system’s dynamics, it makes sense to treat individuals as
atoms (Barabasi 2003; Cho 2009). This has proved useful to understanding
some features of queues, traffic jams, panics, etc.
However, humans do not spend most of their time in queues, in traffic jams
or in stampedes! To limit the grasp of quantitative social theory to just those
few behaviours would be a pity. The problem with the ‘atomistic’ approach is
that it has proved incapable of understanding more complex collective
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dynamics. Many reasons have been put forward to explain this: for example,
human behaviour cannot generally be captured with context-independent
rules which are needed to write an algorithm (Flyvbjerg 2001). But the real
reason, for us, is that the project starts from a restricted vision of the social: why
assume that there first exist simple individual agents, then interactions, then
complex structures – or the opposite? Why distinguish successive moments – in
whatever order?
Such apportioning is especially strange when it is not only possible but also
easy to gather a lot of information on each of individual entity taken severally
so as to draw its extended profiles. If the complexity of individual agents can be
observed and handled, why would it be necessary, first, to strip individual
entities of all their attributes? Why should models proceed according to the
usual way by adding simple rules of interactions between atoms now deprived
of the network of attributes they possessed before? And why should complex-
ity be obtained, in a next step, as a provisional whole since it was there at the
beginning? What might have appeared common sense within a different tech-
nology of data collection might cease to be so now that profiles are so con-
veniently available.
In 1-LS, by contrast, agents cannot be said, strictly speaking, to ‘interact’ with
one another: they are one another, or, better, they own one another to begin
with, since every item listed to define one entity might also be an item in the list
defining another agent (Tarde 1903; 1999 [1895]). In other words, association is
not what happens after individuals have been defined with few properties, but
what characterize entities in the first place (Dewey 1927). It is even possible to
argue that the very notion of ‘interaction’ as an occasional encounter among
separated agents is a consequence of limited information on the attributes
defining the individuals (Latour 2010).
But is there an alternative to the common sense version that distinguishes
atoms, interactions and wholes as successive sequences (whatever the order
and the timing)? An alternative that should not oblige the inquirer to change
gears from the micro to the macro levels as is required by the 2-LS, but remains
fully continuous or, as is claimed by ANT, fully ‘flat’?
It appears to us that one alternative to the atom-interaction-structure is
what has been called by Gabriel Tarde, in reference to Leibniz, a ‘monad’
(Tarde 1999 [1895]). A monad is not a part of a whole, but a point of view on
all the other entities taken severally and not as a totality. Although historians
of philosophy still dispute what a monad was for Leibniz and although there
exist many confusing definitions of what it was for Tarde (Milet 1970; Candea
2010), our claim is that the definition of this admittedly exotic notion may be
rendered fully operational provided one uses the illustration offered by just the
type of navigation through digital profiles we have sketched above.
This argument relies on the practice of slowly learning about what an entity
‘is’ by adding more and more items to its profile. At first the entity is just a dot
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(in our example it is nothing but a proper name ‘Hervé C.’, a clickable entry on
a computer screen) but then it ‘fills in’ with more and more elements that
specify it more and more until the observer considers that he or she knows
enough and begins to take the name of the entity for the entire list. What has
happened? In effect, we have drawn a monad, that is, a highly specific point of
view – this or that entity – on all the other entities present in the dataset. The
point of this navigation is that it does not start with substitutable individuals –
as in the 2-LS – but individualizes an entity by deploying its attributes. The
farther the list of items extends, the more precise becomes the viewpoint of this
individual monad. It begins as a dot, a spot, and it ends (provisionally) as a
monad with an interior encapsulated into an envelope. Were the inquiry to
continue, the ‘whole world’, as Leibniz said, would be ‘grasped’ or ‘reflected’
through this idiosyncratic point of view.
As we saw, the crucial interest of the notion of monad – even if its exotic
metaphysics is put aside – is that it is fully reversible, a feature that was
impossible to render operational before the access to digital media. Each of
the attributes used in order to define the entity is itself modified by becoming
the attribute of this entity. In our example, whereas being ‘professor in Paris
School of Management’ specifies who is ‘Hervé C.’, when we shift, with a few
clicks, to ‘Paris School of Management’ we realize that it has become a slightly
different academic body now that it is able to attract a ‘mathematician’ and a
‘well known economist from abroad’ to be its ‘dean of academic affairs’, which
was not the case before. ‘Paris School of Management’, too, is individualized
and in no way can it be taken for an element of the ‘context’ inside which
‘Hervé C.’ should be ‘framed’. In other words, ‘Paris School of Management’
too is a monad depending on how one navigates through its profile.
What is so refreshing with the new habit of circulation is that they never end
up tracing an entity as ‘part of a whole’ since there is never any whole. The
reason is that with 1-LS there are, strictly speaking, no individual atoms (pro-
files are fully deployed through their attributes), nor aggregates (each attribute
is nothing but the list of actors making it up). The experience of navigating
through profiles available on digital platforms is such that when you move
from one entity – the substance – to its network – the attributes – you don’t go
from the particular to the general, but from particular to more particulars.
In other words, the notion of a ‘context’ might be as much an artifact of
navigational tools as is the notion of an ‘individual’ (Hagerstrand 1953; Gar-
finkel 2002; Latour 2005). Extend the list of items, smooth the navigation,
visualize correctly the ‘interior’ of each monad, and you might not need the
atom-interaction-structure or the actor-system apportionment at all. You will
move from monads to monads without ever leaving the solid ground of
particulars and yet you will never encounter atomistic individuals, except at
the first click, when you begin to inquire about one item and get only an empty
dot.
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By now, our working hypothesis should be clear: it might be feasible to move
from particular to particular and yet to obtain along the way partial totalities
without ever relying on any of the three sets of concepts that make up the
2-LS: there is no individual agent; they don’t interact; there is no whole superior
to the parts. Such a radical conclusion is made at least plausible by the new
datasets that allow entities to be individualized by the never-ending list of
particulars that make them up. Such is what is meant by a monad, a point of
view, or, more exactly, a type of navigation that composes an entity through
other entities and, by doing so, particularizes all of them successively – ‘all of
them’ being an open ended list the size and precision of which always depend
on more inquiries and never from the sudden irruption of a superior level
accessible through a brutal shift in methods.
In other words, datasets may be handled through two opposite navigational
procedures: one that is based on a series of leaps of aggregation (from atoms
to interaction to structure – and back), and the other one, the monadological
principle. Introduced in social theory by Tarde through literary means and then
abandoned because of the lack of empirical handles, this principle can be given
a new career through the newly available techniques of digital navigation and
visualization (Candea 2010).
In summing up this second section, it is important to stress that we are well
aware that such an alternative definition remains highly sensitive to the quality
and quantity of information available as well as to the visualization techniques
at our disposal. Remember that our argument is strictly limited to the search
process through data sets and that we don’t consider how those attributes are
gathered from ‘real life’. We recognize that tracing monads will not be always
feasible. For most entities, the profiling will be impossible for a number of
reasons: a) our observation techniques are too rough to follow each entity
individually – this might still be the case with ants in an anthill, cells in an
organ, human actors in a large survey; b) the entities are really interchangeable
since there is no way, even with the most sophisticated tracking device, to
detect differences among them – this will be the case with atoms in a gas
(Jensen 2001); c) even though it is possible to track their differences, most of
the information has to be deleted or kept secret for ethical reasons – this is
most often the case with telephone calls, social networks, health files, etc.; d) in
spite of their claim to transparency and equality, most present day databases
are rife with inequalities of status and most entrench rather crude definitions
of the social world.
What we claim is simply that every time it is possible to use profiles, then the
monadological principle will obtain. The reason why we insist so much on this
feature is to follow another of Tarde’s insights that a 1-LS social theory should
in no way be limited to human actors. Every time inquirers have succeeded,
through clever research strategy, to trace individualizing profiles of agents –
baboons (Strum and Fedigan 2000), bacteria (Stewart et al. 2004), scientific
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papers (Chavalarias and Cointet 2009), social networks (White 2008), corpo-
rations (Stark and Vedres 2006), to take a few examples that have provided
striking results – the weight of the 2-LS has diminished considerably. For
instance, early primatologists considered baboons as being ‘in’ a strictly rigid
male dominated social structure until more advanced individualizing tech-
niques allowed the mapping out of the contribution of all the superimposed
individuals revealing the striking social skills of females baboons as well as
males (Strum 1987). This is the reason why, in our view, the 1-LS navigation
procedure could offer a useful alternative in collecting and organizing datasets.
3. Doing away with the ‘dispatcher’
After having shown how the notion of monads may modify the distribution of
roles between atomistic agents and interactions, we have to tackle how it could
be used as a substitute for the notion of structure – no matter if this structure
appears before interactions as in holistic theories or at the end as in individu-
alistic ones. Do we really need it to make sense of collective behaviour now
that it has become easier to have access to extended profiles?
The problem comes from the baseline that is used in the 2-LS to frame this
question. In its most classic version, the 2-LS approach is built on the presup-
position that collective behaviours are determined by some sort of centre that
we will call, to use a bland term, a dispatcher. This dispatcher remains always
present whatever the name it has been given in the course of intellectual
history: Providence, super-organism, State, body politic, natural selection, etc.
Such an idea is so deeply rooted that even those who challenge its existence
can’t help but take it as a baseline. It is because they feel obliged to discuss the
existence of this dispatcher that so many scientists, when they begin to build
their models, frame the question in the following way: ‘How come that those
agents are able to produce an order without any dispatcher?’
For instance, how ants, without any super-organism and in the absence of
central planning such as the ‘spirit of the anthill’, are none the less able to
design such exquisitely functional nests (Wilson 1975; Khuong et al. 2011); how
a stadium audience is able to go through the highly coordinated movements of
the ‘Ola!’ without any centralized agent giving a signal or providing instruc-
tions for its striking wave pattern (Farkas et al. 2002); how birds in a flock,
selfish calculating agents in a market, and so on and so forth, manage to reach
order without any order being given? No ant ‘sees the whole nest’; no football
fan oversees the movement of the ‘Ola!’; no bird envisions the whole flock; no
selfish gene anticipates the phenotype that it ends up producing; no economic
agent may eyeball the whole market place, etc. And yet, people seem to
marvel, in the end, that there are structures and orders. So the task of social
theories, they claim, is to understand how such a feat is possible ‘in the absence’
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of any central dispatcher. In all those research programmes, the 2-LS is
framing a contrast between, on the one hand, a dispatcher that could in theory
obtain the same result but is in effect absent and, on the other, the surprising
skill of each of the individual atomistic agent to ‘obey’ the order of a non-
existing master. Is this not something short of a miracle? Indeed . . .
No matter how common sense this framing of the question has become, our
view is that it has propelled many research programmes into an impasse. It
implies that the structure emerging out of interactions between atomistic
agents should, in the end, emulate what this (absent) dispatcher was supposed
to do: namely, to provide orders and rules of behaviour to the agents, even
though, everyone agrees, there is no such order-giving entity. As we shall see,
this framing puts analysts in a double bind, forcing them to simultaneously say
that the structure does the same job as the mythical dispatcher and yet that it
is entirely different since the dispatcher does not exist. The net paradoxical
result is to render the micro to macro paradigm indistinguishable from its
purported opponent, the macro to micro. If there is no dispatcher at all, why
ask from any emergent structure that it none the less fulfil the same kind of
functions as this phantom? The subliminal existence of a dispatcher – even
when it is said not to exist – paralyzes social theories in their search for the
right way to define the key phenomenon of the social. It is the phantom that
frightens research away even more surely than the myth of the atomistic
individual (Tarde 1999a [1895]).
Our view is that in the same way as the 2-LS frames the individual agent as
an atom and thus misses its individualizing profiles (as we saw in section 2), by
framing the structure as a functional equivalent of the (absent) ‘whole’, the
2-LS misses even more surely what it is to be a totality. If monads are not
atoms, they never ‘enter in’ or ‘end up forming’ structures either.
This argument loses its apparent flippancy when taking into consideration,
once again, the practical experience of navigating through data sets. When we
say, for instance, that interacting ants unwittingly produce a perfectly designed
ant nest ‘without’ being themselves aware of the ‘overall plan’, we might have
unwittingly confused two different observing points of view: that of the ant and
that of the ethologist. This is what causes the disconnection in saying that ants,
through their blind interactions, ‘generate’ the emerging structure of the nest.
Strictly speaking, they generate nothing of the sort – the information on the
nest they build is just another monad, an individualized nest defining the ants
that live in it. What we call the ‘emerging structure of the nest’ is a question
that interests the human observer but not the ants themselves. While, in
framing the 2-LS, it seems that there exists a path leading from the first level
to the other, this path is nothing but a spurious connection due to the phantom
of the central dispatcher and the forgetting by scientists of their two discon-
nected observing standpoints. ‘Atomistic-interactions-between-blind-ants-
none-the-less–able-to-solve-the-problem-of-overall-social-order’ is not what
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ants are after. If we wished to be attentive to their experience of totality, ants
should be allowed to direct their attention towards an entirely different
phenomenon from the phantom goal that is pointed out by the 2-LS – such is
the great interest of the concept of ‘stigmergy’ (Theraulaz and Bonabeau
1999).
It might be even less scientific to ask ants to solve this anthropocentric
question since this has little meaning even for humans (Garfinkel 2002)!
Humans too should be allowed to benefit from another experience of total-
ity. The same non sequitur that we might detect with ants holds for humans
– or any entity for which, through the disposition of digital profiles, the
monadological principle obtains. None of those entities is trying to solve the
question of emerging structures any more than ants do. What they are busily
after is something entirely different since each monad, by definition, pos-
sesses its own particular view of the ‘whole’. What was a spurious connection
for ants is also a spurious connection for humans. Ants and ANT travel along
the same paths . . .
If we wish to navigate through individualizing profiles, we will have to take
into account as many wholes as there are entities, and we should not try to trace
a road from blind atoms to emerging structures. 1-LS social theories should be
allowed to deploy another experience of totalities exactly as much as they
deploy another experience of what it is to be an individual agent. Our argu-
ment is that digital techniques seem to chip away at both ends of what so many
social theories take as their indispensable anchors, thereby offering an occa-
sion to illustrate other views of social order (Tarde 1999b [1895]).
And yet it is difficult to loosen the impression that human agents are really
different and should be treated differently to other entities. They are different
but not necessarily for the reason usually put forward by those who like to
extend the quantitative methods of natural sciences to human societies.
Humans differ because they are often themselves equipped with many instru-
ments to gather, compile, represent or even calculate the ‘whole’ in which they
are said to reside (Desrosières 2002). This has been the key feature of eth-
nomethodology (Garfinkel 1967). It is also an important tenet of so many
science and technology studies (STS) and the central argument of actor-
network theory (ANT) that the practical instruments that allow one actor to
‘see the whole society’ should be taken into account for any experience of the
social order (Law 2004; Latour 2005). This vast research programme has been
carried out for physics (Galison 2003), biology (Landecker 2007), accounting
(Power 1995), economics (Callon 1998), as well as for cartography (Jacob
2006), geography (Glennie and Thrift 2009) and even sociology (Foucault
2003). Every time, it is possible to show that instruments provide a highly
focused but limited view of the whole, what have been called, for this reason,
oligoptica instead of panoptica (Latour and Hermant 1998). Such is the type of
‘stigmergy’ proper to human societies.
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The existence of those oligoptica is typical of human societies and the reason
why it makes sense to speak about wholes when referring to human
associations. Yet many different types of ‘wholes’ have to be considered in
order to account for the peculiar obsession of human monads for describing
the interactions they enter and for describing, stabilizing, simplifying and
standardizing their overlapping connections (see section 5).This has little to do
with moving from one level to another one, as is implied by 2-LS. It is one thing
to say that ants (or birds, or cells, or atoms) do not benefit from those ‘intel-
lectual technologies’ in order to build partial wholes while human agents do,
but it is an entirely different thing to say that there exists a second level, that
of the whole that would be common to both ants and humans. The two
arguments don’t follow from one another at all.
To capture what is none the less a real difference with humans (especially
highly scientificized and technicized human collectives), let’s say that monads
are best captured through a 1.5 level standpoint (1.5-LS). By this expression
we mean to say that a) even though each monad has its own version of the
totality, a series of intellectual and technical instruments exists to foster the
overlapping of different individual definitions, without those various defini-
tions ever coalescing into a second level that would unify all of them; and that
b) this is what explains the impression that there is ‘more’ in collective actions
than what exists in individuals taken in the atomistic sense of the word. This
expression of 1.5-LS is simply a way to remind the reader of our general
argument that the two endpoints of so many social theories might have lost
much of their relevance when something else, the monadological principle,
offers another experience of navigation through digital data sets.
The conclusion of this third section is that another experience of ‘being in a
whole’ should be explored that has little to do with ‘being a part’ of a ‘struc-
ture’ no matter if this structure is a sui generis super-organism or an emerging
level.
4. How to navigate through overlapping monads
After having seized the occasion of digital tools to test Tarde’s alternative
definition of atoms, interactions and structures, we might now be better
equipped to see whether we can render operational his notion of overlapping
monads by visualizing them in a coherent way. It is our contention that most of
the arguments against the 1-LS and 1.5-LS (and more narrowly against Tarde’s
unexpected come back) are due to the lack of efficient visualizing tools. In
their absence, even though there exists an alternative to the 2-LS, it is the only
one that seems acceptable as a fall back.
To go some way toward answering the first question, we will use the example
of scientific paradigms. Their study benefits today from a level of quality and
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availability of information unmatched in other domains of collective behav-
iour: almost every word written by every author in every paper cited by any
later text is accessible in a few clicks in digital format (Grauwin et al. 2009;
Grauwin 2011; Grauwin et al. 2012; Cointet 2009). This choice is the more
reasonable since it has been at the heart of much STS (Merton 1973) (and the
preferred example of Tarde . . .). One might even argue that the level and
precision of information that, before the advent of digital tools, were accessible
only for the spread of scientific keywords and concepts through papers
and citations, have now become the standard for all sorts of individualizing
profiles – a seminal idea that has not been lost on the founders of Google (Brin
and Page 1998).
Let’s follow the navigation through profiles to answer the question: ‘What
does it mean to be ‘part of’ a paradigm P?’ According to the monadological
principle, the departure point matters little since from every entity we will end
up visiting the list of all its attributes grasped from this specific point of view:
we may start at will from one scientist, one paper, one keyword, one institution
or one experimental method. Let us begin in the case of ‘self organization’
from papers with keywords and citations (Grauwin 2011).
So the problem now becomes how to map out as many wholes as there are
parts, that is, monads. Instead of partitioning atoms, then interactions, then
structures, we now want do draw intersecting monads where some attributes in
one list are also visible in some other entity’s list (Figure III). Instead of the
common research strategy: ‘Go from simple interactions to more complex
structures’ we wish to apply a counterintuitive one: ‘Start with complex over-
lapping monads and detect the few attributes they share’.
It is true that by proposing such a navigation we move away from the dream
of simulation and prediction and explore another path, that of description
where the added value is no longer the power of prediction, but the progres-
sive shift from confusing overlaps to successive clarifications of provisional
wholes. Instead of trying to simulate and predict the social orders, we wish to
acknowledge the limitations of the simulation approach for collective systems
and prefer letting the agents produce a dynamics and collect the traces that
their actions leave as they unfold so as to produce a rich data set (Grauwin
2011). In other words, data mining does not result in the same scientific habits
as simulation: instead of asking how global structures emerge from local inter-
actions, we propose to illustrate a navigational tool that shifts the attention of
the observer from confusing overlaps to the few elements that travel from one
monad to the next, much in the same way as standards do in technological
systems (Gleenie and Thrift 2009).
Before complaining that this is too confusing, one should remember how
confusing it was to have, first, to specify a general structure (the paradigm of
self organization), and then to qualify it by endless individual idiosyncrasies
that ‘didn’t fit’ into the picture. Thomas Kuhn, who first introduced the notion
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of paradigm, knew fairly well how clumsy it was, and every scientist knows how
difficult it is to draw precisely the domain in which he or she works. Is it
possible to do justice to such a common experience by shifting from prediction
and simulation to description and data mining? Our approach suggests a way
of navigating through these datascapes with a monadological point of view,
which can capture the richness of associations while remaining faithful to the
complexity of agents.
This is where the question of visualization becomes so crucial: Is there a
comprehensible space in which idiosyncratic monads may be projected that
could reveal their intersecting features without losing their specificity? To
explore this possibility we have to take into account two common practices in
handling data sets.
The first is the very humble and often unnoticed gesture we all make when
we surround a list of features with a circle (a shape often referred to as a
‘potato’!) and decide to say that all those elements are ‘roughly similar’ and
Figure III: Keyword ‘self-organization’ considered as a partial ‘whole’
Note: Keyword ‘self-organization’ considered as a ‘whole’ produced by the intersection of
articles that are far richer than this single keyword.We use the same procedure as in Figure I,
but limit the visualization to the 18 articles published in 1991 and omit the articles’
references. To highlight the idea of ‘intersection’, the attributes of three ‘monads’ (articles)
are shown enclosed by an ellipse.
All images are available in high quality at http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/
monads
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may share the same name (it does not matter here if this is done by eyeballing
data or through highly sophisticated calculations of correspondences). The
point is that we should be able to draw such a circle without leaving the 1-LS
since the whole is not the structure to which the elements will be said to
pertain as in the 2-LS but another monad just as specific as the other that
‘makes it up’. (Remember the example of how to define ‘Paris School of
Management’ in section 1). The gesture of adding a circle is simply the recog-
nition of the outside limit of a monad – whose envelope, we should remember,
is defined by the list of all its individualizing attributes – and not the delinea-
tion of the ‘role’ it ‘plays’ ‘inside’ a ‘structure’.To say it in other words, in a 1-LS
world the borders of monads should be defined by the provisional end of the
expansion of their content and not by adding a category coming from
elsewhere.
The second practical experience to take into account is that many new
movements through datasets are possible on screen that were not possible
when manipulating paper (a feature that make writing articles on this topic
very tricky indeed!). The projection of intersecting monads ceases to be so
confusing if it is possible to highlight each of them in succession and to detect
how each of them contribute to the overlapping set (see the accompanying film
http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/monads/video ). As we said above,
it is this new navigational skill that has made the two end-points of ‘individual
agent’ and ‘structure’ less relevant than the superposition of actors-networks
highlighted in succession (see Figure III).
If we take into account the experience of digital navigation, what happens to
the notion of ‘whole’? When we navigate on a screen, zooming in and out,
changing the projection rules, aggregating and disaggregating according to
different variables, what stands out is what remains constant through the
shifting of viewpoints (Gibson 1986). This is our ‘whole’. As expected, its size
has shrunk considerably! Instead of being a structure more complex than its
individual components, it has become a simpler set of attributes whose inner
composition is constantly changing. The whole is now much smaller than the
sum of its parts.To be part of a whole is no longer to ‘enter into’ a higher entity
or to ‘obey’ a dispatcher (no matter if this dispatcher is a corporate body, a sui
generis society, or an emergent structure), but for any given monad it is to lend
part of itself to other monads without either of them losing their multiple
identities.
To sum up this section, we are now left with two opposite ideas of what it is
to analyse complex collective phenomena. In the 2-LS, it is possible to build a
model on condition that one begins with simple atoms interacting through
simple rules and test whether some stable structure emerges in the end. In the
1-LS, you begin, on the contrary, from highly complex actor-networks that
don’t exactly ‘interact’ but rather overlap with one another, and you extract
from those overlapping sets the attributes that some of them share. If the data
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navigation techniques we are proposing work – and it is a big ‘if’ – we will have
succeeded in mapping a collective phenomenon without ever considering
either individual components or structure. In which case, we would have vin-
dicated the insight Tarde could not render operational because of the absence
of digitally available data . . .
5. Learning to visualize partial ‘wholes’
What does it mean to follow a collective phenomenon in the 1-LS navigational
procedure? When one observer begins to quickly transform a clickable dot
into a fully defined monad by listing its attributes, he or she is already dealing
with a collective phenomenon (though in a sense that does not resemble the
2-LS definition of collective). The observer is gathering successive items and
encircling them inside what has become the proper name of a specific monad.
As such he or she is dealing with an 1-LS collective, or better, a collecting
activity: it is this monad that gathers, assembles, specifies, grasps, encapsulates,
envelops those attributes in a unique way.
So, whereas in 2-LS some agents are designated to play the role of ‘parts’
while others are said to be ‘wholes’, when navigating through profiles in 1-LS
we don’t introduce any difference between entities. In the example above, any
thread may be chosen as our departing point for defining a paradigm: a
researcher, a paper, a university, a concept or a keyword. Each of them is
equally a ‘part’ and a ‘whole’, that is, a monad (or an actor-network). In other
words, each entity is entitled to have its own curriculum vitae, that is, its own
trajectory through successive attributes.
The fact that in 1-LS all entities have the same status does not mean that
they are all the same. It is a common experience while navigating a dataset that
some entities recur more often than others. For example, in section 1 we said
that ‘Paris School of Management’ entered into the profile (or the curriculum
vitae) of ‘Hervé C.’ According to our data set however, we may also notice that
it appears in the profiles of ‘Dominique B.’ and ‘Pierre-André R.’ etc.We know
that this repetition does not mean that it is a ‘structure’ of which those three
academics would simply be ‘members’ even though we might be tempted to
shorthand this list by stating things just this way thus falling back on the 2-LS.
What we want is to remain in a 1-LS or in 1.5-LS.
To understand why we should resist the temptation of shortcutting this
series of repetitions by treating them as an emerging structure, consider the
fact that each time ‘Paris School of Management’ is listed in the profile of
another monad it is repeated with variations.As we said in section 1, every time
an entity is associated with a new monad, it’s individualized through the
previous associations gathered by that monad. The ‘Paris School of Manage-
ment’ of ‘Hervé C.’ is modified as much as by being the ‘Paris School of
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Management’ of ‘Dominique B.’ Thus what we now have is a new file made up
of the repetition of the same attributes plus the variations it has undergone in
each of the composing monads. Such a file is what social scientists are used to
call an ‘institution’, an ‘organization’, or, more blandly, a group.
This new point needs to be tackled with a great many precautions because,
in the 2-LS, it has been confused with that of structure conceived as higher-
level entities mysteriously emerging from lower-level interactions. Emerging
on another level, structures are said to be independent from the interactions
that generated them and yet able to send orders, to define place, to attributes
roles to the ‘parts’ in the way expected from dispatchers. It is this confusion
that has created the idea of a ‘corporate body’ of which the passing humans
would simply be provisional ‘members’. Many a moving speech has been given
by deans about the contrast between, for instance, the ‘long lasting body’ of the
University and the quick turn over of its transitory mortal occupants – a
two-level standpoint if any . . .
In 1-LS, institutions are nothing like structures, they are just a trajectory
through data starting from a different entry point in the database: instead of
asking which institutions are listed in the profile of particular individual, we
ask which individuals are listed in the profile of an institution. It is the same
matrix but not the same navigation: the ‘wholes’ are nothing more than several
other ways of handling the interlocking of profiles. It is this type of navigation
to which Tarde gave the confusing name of ‘imitation’ and this type of spread
he called ‘imitative rays’ (Tarde 1903; Sperber 1996). If we are right, ‘imitation’
for him is not first of all a psychological phenomenon, but the realization that
monads share attributes modified by each sharing, the result of which is a list
made up of the ‘same’ item repeated with difference (Deleuze 2005).
There is therefore no substantial distinction to be introduced between
individuals and groups or institutions. The only difference in what we call
institutions is the one monad that recurs more often in the database – and
this detection is empirical and depends entirely on the quality of the data-
base. In the example we used in the introduction of this paper, the only thing
that distinguishes ‘Paris School of Management’ from ‘Hervé C.’ is the fact
that the former might be counted more times than the latter . . . If in the
dataset an attribute is cited more often, then it is an organization, that is,
what is distributed through a multiplicity of monads without itself being
more complex than any of them – much in the manner of a circulating stand-
ard. If Hervé C. was cited more often than his school, he would be that
institution . . .
If this purely quantitative difference seems too extreme, we should be aware
that ‘organizations’ and ‘participants’ like all the other terms we have gone
through in this paper – ‘parts’, ‘wholes’, ‘individual’, ‘structure’, ‘members’,
‘monads’ – are nothing but ways of navigating through limited datasets. Indi-
vidualizing, collecting, grouping, and coordinating are so many trails left by
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search engines through profiles made up of attributes encapsulated in names
as shorthand. As Tarde so vividly described, all those canonical terms of social
theory are simply the registration of quantitative differences in the relative
spread of attributes (Tarde 1903; Latour 2010).
Such a definition of a group may solve a conundrum that has made it very
difficult to focus on the main phenomenon of the social – and may also help
visualizing the 1-LS. 2-LS theories are often based on the contradictory idea
that the macro level is made of virtual but stable entities while the micro level
is made of real but transitory entities. Paradoxically, what lasts longer is said to
exist only virtually, while what ‘really’ exist does not seem to be made to last
. . . A strange type of definition that goes a long way toward explaining the
mystery surrounding collective phenomena, be they those of cells in a body
(Riboli-Sasco 2010), ants in anthill or actors in society (Karsenti 2006).
In the 1-LS, on the contrary, there is no paradox about the fact that the
profiles that last are made up by attributes that do not last (Debaise 2008). If
this process seemed mysterious, it is only because we tried to explain it with the
wrong distinction – the one between the virtual and the real, the macro and the
micro, the general and the particular – instead of explaining it with the dis-
tinction between what is passed from one monad to the other and the trans-
formation undergone by what is passed. If ‘Paris School of Management’ lasts,
it is not because it is above or even different from the composing monads. It is
because it is repeated with variations from one monad to the next: enough
repetition to be recognizable as the same; enough variation to be carried along
further in time and space. Far from existing on a higher, virtual level, what we
call institutions, organizations or groups are nothing but the effort of monads
to make some of their attributes flexible enough to be translated by a great
many other monads and yet stable enough to be recognized through their
transformations (Figure IVa and b).The work necessary to trace the borders of
an entity and assign it a proper noun is part of such effort, as well as the work
of preserving the continuity of such names and boundaries (White 2008).
Once again, we have to understand that encircling a bundle of traits with a
shape does not mean that a structure is taking over but simply that the limit of
a monad is being reached and underlined. Inside this circle, everything might
change through time: for instance ‘self-organization’ at time zero may be made
up of the keywords, authors, and concepts A, B, C, and after a few iterations it
might transformed to include X, Y, Z. Every single item composing successive
‘self-organization’ profiles may change and the name may change as well (what
we call ‘self-organization’ today used to be something entirely different a few
decades ago). What matters is that the change be gradual enough to preserve
some continuity. Everything may change, but not at the same time. We should
not say: ‘And yet it is the same self-organization bundle’ as if, through those
changes, something, the structure, had remained the same (although virtually).
We should say: ‘Look, on the contrary, how different it is; but because of the
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Figure IV: (a) and (b): Gradual evolution of the ‘whole’ defined by the keyword ‘self-
organization’ from 1990 to 2009
(a)
(b)
[Figure IV: Continued over]
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ways participants have interlocked their definitions, each change has inherited
something from its predecessor through a channel that can now be traced by
clicking on the profile of this participant’. Once again, a different navigation
generates a different definition of what is a collective, that is, a collected entity.
Strictly speaking, we should stop talking of collective phenomena distinct from
individual ones, but only of many different types of collecting phenomena.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have seized the occasion given by the sudden proliferation of
digital databases to revisit an ancient social theory proposed by Gabriel Tarde
before the availability of large statistical tools and before the entrenchment of
many social theories within the 2-LS paradigm. It is because those databases
provide the common experience to define the specificity of an actor as tanta-
mount to expanding its network, that there is a chance to escape from choosing
between what pertains to the individual and what pertains to the structure.
Monads dissolve the quandary, and redefine the notion of the whole by relo-
cating it as what overlapping entities inherit from one another.
We are well aware that those data bases are full of defects, that they them-
selves embody a rather crude definition of society, that they are marked by
strong asymmetries of power, and above all that they mark only a passing
moment in the traceability of the social connections. In addition, we are
painfully aware of the narrow constraints put upon them by network analysis
and by the limitations of the visualizing tools available today. But it would be
Figure IV: Continued
Notes: (a). For each 5-year time slice ( ), we choose the 10 most prolific authors ( ) and the
10 most used references ( ) and keywords ( ). Authors, keywords or references are linked
to the 5-year time slice in which they appear. The figure shows that, although most entities
(authors, keywords or references) change through time, each time slice inherits something
from its predecessor. For example, in the 1990s, scientists interlocked their definition of
self-organization through ‘neural networks’, while in the 2000s, ‘growth’ of ‘nanostructures’
became a more powerful link. This operation is perfectly reversible, as shown in Figure IV
(b) by taking the example of author J.M. Lehn, a chemistry Nobel Prize winner. Proceeding
in exactly the same way as in Figure IV (a), we show that, while JM Lehn remains connected
through all these years to ‘Supramolecular Chemistry’ and ‘Complexes’, his co-workers
change. So do his main fields of interest, shifting from ‘Double Helix’ or ‘Ligands’ in the
1990s to ‘Self-assembly’ in the 2000s. Both Figures show that the arrow of time is not
necessarily linear (which would show as a linear arrangement of ), but is somewhat circular
because several items occur throughout the years, building an effective attraction between
the first 5-year time slice and the last.
All images are available in high quality at http://medialab.sciences-po.fr/publications/
monads
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a pity to miss this occasion to explore such a powerful alternative that may
provide another way to render the social sciences empirical and quantitative
without losing their necessary stress on particulars.
(Date accepted: October 2011)
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